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INTRODUCTION
As Justice John Paul Stevens approached the end of his career on the
Supreme Court, he contended that his lengthy service as an Associate Justice
featured a jurisprudence of marked consistency. In 2007, when an interviewer
asked what accounted for his being perceived initially as a "moderate conservative" and later as a liberal stalwart, Justice Stevens responded: "There are more
members of the court now who are not moderate conservatives. . . . There are
changes in the court that have to be taken into account."' Later that year, he
sharpened his answer for a profile that ran in the New York Times Magazine. "I
don't think that my votes represent a change in my own thinking," Justice

* Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. @ 2011, Justin Driver. I would like to
thank the Editors of The Georgetown Law Journalfor organizing this symposium to examine the career
of Justice Stevens. I received particularly valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Essay from
Laura Ferry, William Forbath, Jacob Gersen, Sanford Levinson, David Pozen, Lucas Powe, and David
Rabban. Charles Mackel, Christine Tamer, and Mark Wiles provided excellent research assistance.
1. An Interview with Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, THE TIRD BRANcH (Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, Office of Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1, 11.
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Stevens stated. "I'm just disagreeing with changes that the others are making." 2
Legal scholars and journalists have also advanced the notion that Justice
Stevens generally remained constant as the Court around him changed. Professor Cass R. Sunstein built upon this narrative in suggesting that the shift in
perception of Stevens's place on the Court illuminated how dramatically the
institution had turned to the right. "For a long period, Justice Stevens was well
known as a maverick and a centrist-independent-minded, hardly liberal, and
someone whose views could not be put into any predictable category," Sunstein
wrote. "He is now considered part of the Court's 'liberal wing.' In most areas,
Justice Stevens has changed little if at all; what has changed is the Court's
center of gravity." 3 Charles Lane pithily expressed the point in the Washington
Post: "As the country, the court and the GOP moved right, Stevens did not."4
By the time Justice Stevens retired last year, this notion had hardened into
conventional wisdom. The ABA Journal story announcing Stevens's departure
tellingly began: "The more things changed, the more John Paul Stevens stayed
the same."s
Like many oft-repeated narratives, this one is not wholly inaccurate. Indeed,
it cannot be denied that the Court grew increasingly conservative during the
course of Justice Stevens's tenure. As Justice Stevens himself often suggested,
nearly every Justice who has retired since he joined the Court in 1975 has been
replaced by a more conservative Justice.6 But it is incorrect to suggest that, as
the Court became more conservative, Stevens generally remained in the same
place. Instead, he moved sharply to the left-especially in cases raising society's most divisive legal questions. Examining Justice Stevens's early years on
the Court reveals a Justice who cast votes and wrote opinions that would be
inconceivable if he had issued them during his later years.
The goal here, however, is not to play an elaborate game of jurisprudential
gotcha. To the contrary, this Essay contends that such games, played with

2. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter,N.Y TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 50, 56 (emphasis omitted).
CASs R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING CouRrs ARE WRONG FOR

3.

AMERICA 11 (2005). Professor Robert Schapiro has endorsed a similar notion. "The composition of the
court and nature of the issues has changed," Schapiro stated. "I think [Justice Stevens's] substantive
positions have stayed largely the same." Joan Biskupic, Senior Justice Has a Leading Role at Pivotal
Juncture, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 2007, at 6A.
4. Charles Lane, With Longevity on Court, Stevens's Center-Left Influence on Court Has Grown,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 2006, at At; see also Adam Liptak, At 89, Stevens Contemplates the Law, and

How to Leave It, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2010, at Al ("His views have generally remained stable ... while the
court has drifted to the right over time.").
5. Richard Brust, Practical Meaning: As the Court Shifted Right, Stevens Kept His Place, 96

A.B.A. J. 48, 53 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 2, at 52. Setting aside Justice Sotomayor's replacement of Justice
Souter and Justice Kagan's replacement of Justice Stevens (because it is too early in their tenures yet to
have a firm grasp on their jurisprudential values), the one generally acknowledged exception to this rule
is Justice Ginsburg's replacement of Justice White. See Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in
Decades, N.Y TIMEs, July 25, 2010, at Al.
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perhaps greatest fervor by Supreme Court Justices themselves,7 are symptomatic of a larger problem that pervades legal discourse. At its core, the problem
involves the excessive emphasis that the legal community places upon judges
maintaining voting records free of contradiction. Not only has judicial consistency been overvalued, but judicial inconsistency itself often contains considerable virtue, as it demonstrates a willingness to engage in continued contemplation
and reflection-traits that excellent judges must possess. Rather than categorically perceiving a claim of judicial inconsistency as an epithet, such a claim
should at least potentially be understood as a compliment.8
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I documents how at the
outset of his career Justice Stevens often cast conservative votes in hot-button
cases before transforming into the Court's most outspoken liberal. With Justice
Stevens's transformation established as a point of departure, Part II suggests
that the legal community unduly emphasizes the virtue of a judge maintaining a
consistent judicial record, and contends that judicial inconsistency contains
under-appreciated virtue. Part Ill notes that, despite the abstract valorization of
consistency, actual instances of judicial inconsistency often serve to enhance
rather than diminish a judge's reputation. As befits this brief Essay, a brief
conclusion follows.

I. THE STEVENS

SHIFT

This Part chronicles Justice Stevens's initially conservative jurisprudential
views in three highly salient areas: abortion, criminal procedure, and affirmative
action. Justice Stevens's jurisprudence doubtlessly underwent marked change in
other significant doctrinal areas.9 Nevertheless, these three issues merit particular scrutiny because few matters have been-or remain today-as ideologically

7. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), Justice Alito's opinion for the
Court appeared to engage in jurisprudential gotcha. Justice Alito explicitly mentioned that it was Justice
Stevens who-though he was in dissent in Ledbetter-wrote the Court's opinion in United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), a key precedent that the Court claimed recommended the result it
reached. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 625 ("As Justice Stevens wrote for the Court . . . ."). Justice Stevens
was not exactly a stranger to the technique. See Bradley C. Canon, Justice John PaulStevens: The Lone
Ranger in a Black Robe, in THE BURGER CouRr. POLMCAL AND JUDIcIAL PRoFIas 343, 346 (Charles M.
Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991) ("Another favorite Stevens tactic was to cite particular justices
against themselves.").
8. This Essay takes a broad understanding of judicial inconsistency, meaning that it considers
instances both when judges espouse conflicting views in cases involving precisely the same legal
question and when judges adopt a position that seems discordant with their earlier jurisprudence.
9. Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foind., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) ("To say that one may avoid
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy
for an assault is to run away after the first blow."), with FCC v. FOX Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1824-25 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the FCC's policy prohibiting
"fleeting expletives" was impermissible); compare also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976)
(Stevens, J., joining) (upholding the validity of the death penalty), with Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (announcing that he had arrived at the conclusion that
capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment).
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charged as reproductive rights, crime, and race."o
A. ABORTION

Some commentators have asserted that Justice Stevens has consistently voted
with liberals in the line of cases that began with Roe v. Wade." But this
assertion is demonstrably false. In 1976, the Court confronted a Missouri statute
that required a married woman-in order to obtain an abortion-to receive
consent from her husband and required a young woman under the age of
eighteen to receive consent from her parents.1 2 Although Stevens voted to
invalidate the spousal consent; provision, he wrote a dissenting opinion explaining that he would uphold the parental consent provision.13 Justice Stevens's
opinion emphasized that "the consequences of her decision may have a profound impact on her entire future life" and made clear that he rejected the
notion that "the state legislature has no power to enact legislation for the
purpose of protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an
incorrect decision." 14
Justice Stevens's language here bears some resemblance to the muchcriticized language that Justice Anthony Kennedy used four years ago in
Gonzales v. Carhart,the decision that validated the federal ban on the procedure
that pro-life advocates labeled "partial-birth abortion."' 5 "The State has an
interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed," Justice Kennedy
wrote. 16 "It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort

10. Intriguingly, one of the few areas in which commentators have suggested that Justice Stevens
shifted is an area where he appears to have long been consistent: gay rights. Robert Bork asserted last
year: "It's in recent years that Stevens has most become an activist judge, on issues like homosexual
rights." Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 39, 45 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Apart from whether one agrees with Bork's characterization of judicial decisions recognizing
gay rights as "activis[m]," Stevens seems to have arrived at the Court with a progressive vision in this
area. Shortly after joining the Court, Justice Stevens, along with Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan,
sought to hear oral argument in a case where a three-judge district panel upheld Virginia's anti-sodomy
provision. Instead, however, the Court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision. See BOB
WooDWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME Couar 516 (1st paperback ed.
2005).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Toobin, supra note 10, at 41 ("Stevens has always supported
abortion rights .... ).
12. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976).
13. Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 102-03.
15. 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007); see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:

Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1707 (2008) ("The Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act may regulate a medical procedure, but its roots lie in constitutional politics, not the
practice of medicine.").

16. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (majority opinion). But see id. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("This
way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the Constitutionideas that have long since been discredited."); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and
Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1194-97 (2010) (identifying the trauma-based
rhetoric in Justice Kennedy's Gonzales opinion as a recent iteration of a phenomenon that enjoys a long
history).
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must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound ... . 17 Yet,
it is important not to exaggerate the similarities between the two opinions. After
all, Justice Kennedy's opinion regarded adults, and Justice Stevens's regarded
minors. And the law often protects children in ways that it does not protect
adults.' 8 Nevertheless, given that Justice Stevens has openly criticized the tone
of Justice Kennedy's Gonzales opinion,' 9 it seems worth considering whether
Justice Stevens would phrase his concerns of 1976 in precisely the same terms
if he were to write that opinion today. More to the point, of course, if a parental
consent provision were to have come before the Court even as early as the
1980s, it seems highly unlikely that Justice Stevens would have required a
young woman to bring a pregnancy to term if she could not obtain permission
from her parents for an abortion.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Justice Stevens is correctly understood to have provided the Court's leading
liberal voice on behalf of criminal defendants at the end of his career.2 0 But his
early voting record provided little reason to believe that things would turn out
that way. Indeed, three decisions regarding the criminally accused-all selected
from his first full year on the Court-vividly reveal Justice Stevens's marked
leftward turn in this arena.
In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court contemplated whether a prosecutor could constitutionally cross-examine a defendant regarding his failure to offer an exculpatory
story immediately after being arrested and receiving Miranda warnings. 2 1 JUStice Powell, writing on behalf of the Court, held that permitting prosecutors to
impeach criminal defendants at trial with post-arrest silence would violate due
process.2 2 While it is easy to imagine the Justice Stevens of 2006 writing an
impassioned concurrence insisting that the invalidated prosecutorial practice
threatened to nullify Miranda,23 the Justice Stevens of thirty years earlier

17. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. It seems worth noting here that Justice Kennedy ill-advisedly uses
the word "mother" rather than "woman" for the person who has received an abortion. All people who
receive abortions are women, but not all women who receive abortions are mothers.
18. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (finding that child pornography was not
entitled to First Amendment protection).
19. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 54 (reporting that Stevens found "Kennedy's rhetoric about the need
to protect women from the emotional trauma of abortions" to be "frustrating").
20. See Jason J. Czarnezki, William K. Ford & Lori A. Ringhand, An Empirical Analysis of the
Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CoNsT. COsMaNr. 127,

148-49 (2007) (identifying Justice Stevens as the member of the Rehnquist Court who least often voted
conservatively in criminal cases).
21. 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
22. Id. at 618.
23. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1210 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending, against
the Court's opinion written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice Sotomayor, that the standard
warning used by Tampa Bay police officers informing defendants of their rights upon arrest inadequately conveyed the Mirandaright to "have counsel present during interrogation").
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instead wrote the lead dissent.24
In South Dakota v. Opperman, the Court issued a foundational criminal
procedure opinion, decided by a 5-4 margin, finding that the warrantless
inventory search of an impounded automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 25 Justice Stevens--over the dissent of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White-joined with President Richard Nixon's four Supreme Court
appointees to form the majority. 26 By the end of his time on the Court, in sharp
contrast to his vote in Opperman, the Fourth Amendment had few friends as
staunch as Justice Stevens..
Finally, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,Justice Stevens joined the Court's
opinion holding that officials at fixed checkpoints near the U.S.-Mexico border
could determine which people to select for enhanced inspection "even if it be
assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry." 2 8 Writing for himself and Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan issued a
bitter dissent, noting "[t]hat deep resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair
discrimination" given that "[e]very American citizen of Mexican ancestry and
every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision
that" their rights are more vulnerable than those of "non-Mexican appearing
motorists." 2 9 Justice Brennan's dissent, attuned as it is to the perceptions of
law-abiding racial minorities, is strikingly reminiscent of opinions written by
the latter-day Justice Stevens.3 0
C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Justice Stevens also shifted dramatically to the left regarding the government's use of race-conscious measures designed to increase diversity. During
his early years on the Court, Justice Stevens may well have been the institu-

24. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

25. 428 U.S. 364, 365, 376 (1976).
26. Id. at 365, 384, 396.
27. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 389-90 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding in a

lone dissent that police officers violated the Fourth Amendment's provision regarding seizures when
they rammed a fleeing suspect's automobile from behind following a high-speed chase); Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 633-34 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court was
incorrect to conclude that the Fourth Amendment permitted police officers, pursuant to an arrest, to
search the passenger compartment of a car and any containers therein). I do not mean to suggest, of
course, that Justice Stevens was uniformly pro-defendant. See Ward Farnsworth, Dissents Against Type,
93 Miu4. L. REV. 1535, 1547 (2009) (observing that Stevens's judicial "type" has "never quite been"
one who always votes for the defendant").
28. 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
29. Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132-33 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime
areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal
activity associated with the officer's sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither
'aberrant' nor 'abnormal."'); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 n.20 (1999) (opinion of
Stevens, J.) (observing the racially disparate effect of Reconstruction-era vagrancy laws).
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tion's fiercest proponent of colorblindness. In Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke, Justice Stevens wrote on behalf of a four-Justice plurality
finding that U.C. Davis Medical School's affirmative action program violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Although Justice Stevens's opinion
formally reached only the statutory ground, the opinion's underlying reasoning
could be read as militating against the proposition that the government could
permissibly treat individuals differently on the basis of race.3 2 Justice Stevens
felt so strongly about the issue in 1978, moreover, that he orally delivered his
opinion from the bench, using language that sounds to modem ears as though it
came from the lips of Chief Justice John G. Roberts: "The University of
California through its special admissions policy .excluded Allan Bakke from
participation in its program of medical education because of his race." 3 3 Two
years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Stevens raised the stakes, notoriously comparing the federal government's efforts to assist minority-owned
businesses to Nazi Germany's treatment of Jews.3 4 In dissenting from the
Court's finding that the federal program did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, Justice Stevens stated: "Preferences based on characteristics acquired at
birth foster intolerance and antagonism against the entire membership of the
favored classes."
The Court eventually (at least purportedly) embraced Justice Stevens's call to
treat race-conscious programs designed to assist racial minorities with the same
heavy skepticism as programs designed to hurt them. By the time the Court did
so in 1995 in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, however, Justice Stevens had
changed his mind about the wisdom of that approach.3 6 Int perhaps the most
powerful opinion he wrote during his thirty-five terms on the Court, Justice

31. 438 U.S. 265, 421 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. See id. at 412-18.

33. Oral Opinion of Justice Stevens at 13:15, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), availableat http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_811/opinion; see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, J.)
("The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
34. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing "the First
Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935, translated in 4 Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, Document No. 1417-PS, pp. 8-9 (1946)").
35. Id. at 547.
36. 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, of course, often contended
that tiers of scrutiny did not make sense because, as he put it, "[t]here is only one Equal Protection
Clause." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's latter-day
jurisprudence regarding affirmative action strongly resembled Justice Thurgood Marshall's "sliding
scale" approach to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., MARK V. TusHNE, MAKING
CONSrnTUrIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SuPRE Couar, 1961-1991, at 100 (1997) (describing the sliding scale approach); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as

JudicialMinimalism, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 298, 326 (1998) (suggesting that the Court could "abandon
the strict tier system and implement an explicit sliding scale, h la Justices Marshall and Stevens").
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Stevens warned of the perils of foolish consistency.3 7 "We should reject a
concept of 'consistency' that would view the special preferences that the
National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against African-Americans that was prevalent
for much of our history," Justice Stevens wrote. "The consistency that the Court
espouses would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a
welcome mat." 3 8
Stevens's Adarand dissent is, to be sure, principally concerned with a type of
consistency that differs from the type examined in this Essay. In Adarand,
Stevens addressed what might be referred to as contextual consistency, whereas
this Essay addresses temporal consistency. Although Supreme Court Justices by
the nature of their jobs must spend some time problematizing and identifying
the appropriate boundaries of contextual consistency, they tend to accept reflexively (even if they do not always honor) the value of temporal consistency.
Supreme Court Justices, along with other members of the legal profession,
would be well advised to demonstrate greater consistency in their questioning of
consistency.

II. JUDICIAL CONSISTENCY'S VICE, JUDICIAL INCONSISTENCY'S VIRTUE
Justice Stevens is not the first judge to advance a narrative of judicial
consistency in the face of an apparently inconsistent record. Indeed, Justice
Stevens's claims might be understood as taking a page from a playbook that
Justice Harry A. Blackmun perfected some two decades earlier. Although
Justice Blackmun amassed a generally conservative record upon joining the
Court in 1970, over time he became one of the Court's leading liberals.39 When
asked about this migration from right to left, Blackmun, too, contended that the
Court had merely changed around him.4 o "I don't believe I'm any more liberal,
as such, now than I was before," Blackmun stated in 1983.41 Nine years later,
however, Justice Blackmun seemed to have changed his mind about having
changed his mind. "I suspect that when one goes on the Supreme Court of the
United States his constitutional philosophy is not fully developed," Blackmun
stated. "And if one didn't grow and develop down there I would be disap-

37. See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 24 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., 1993)

("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines.").
38. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244-45.
39. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 235 (2005) (chronicling Blackmun's

judicial migration from right to left); Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of JudicialPreference Change, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1209, 1210 (2005) ("Even in the first decade of his
Supreme Court tenure, [Blackmun] gradually moved from being a reliable vote usually aligned with
Justices Burger and Rehnquist to a Justice much more likely to vote with Brennan and Marshall.").
40. See Nina Totenberg, HarryA. Blackmun: The Conscientious Conscience, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 745,

745 (1994).
41. John A. Jenkins, A CandidTalk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES
26.

MAG.,

Feb. 20, 1983, at 20,
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pointed in that person as a Justice. I would hope that in 1992 almost 20 years
after Roe against Wade that I have grown a little bit in my constitutional
philosophy and my constitutional resolution."4 2
One need not be clairvoyant to understand why Justice Blackmun and Justice
Stevens sought to contend-against substantial evidence to the contrary-that
their respective constitutional visions remained unaltered over time. The explanation, of course, is that judges and legal scholars almost uniformly extol the
virtue of judicial consistency. 43 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is far from alone
in believing that doctrinal consistency constitutes nothing less than a prerequisite for being considered among the first rank of Justices." In that same vein,
three years before he joined the federal bench, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook
contended that, though doctrinal consistency may be impossible for the Supreme Court to achieve as a multi-member institution, it was reasonable to
expect individual Justices to issue consistent rulings. 4 5 "Because each Justice is
dictator of his own decisions," Easterbrook stated, "he may be faulted for
failing [to follow an earlier judgment]. There is no reason why we cannot ask
each Justice to develop a principled jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently."4 6
There are, of course, legitimate reasons justifying the legal community's
emphasis upon the value of consistency. Apart from its intrinsic value, 4 7 consistency is the bedrock of law's stability, without which it would be difficult for
people to order their affairs. The articulation of broad principles designed to
ensure that like cases are treated alike is, for many esteemed judges, the very
quintessence of law. 4 8 Moreover, as Professors Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have observed, "It is our desire for consistency that in significant
42. Paul R. Baier, Mr Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REV.

707, 714 (1994) (quoting audio tape: Justice Harry A. Blackmun, LSU Law Center Summer Program,
Aix-en-Provence, France (July 6-9, 1992)). Justice Blackmun's comment echoed one that Chief Justice
Earl Warren made at the end of his tenure, when he stated that he did not "see how a man could be on
the Court and not change his views substantially over a period of years ... for change you must if you
are to do your duty on the Supreme Court." See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTIcEs AND PRESIDENTs: A
POLMCAL HISTORY OF APPouTmENTs To THE SUPREME CouRT 70 (3d ed. 1992).
43. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTrruTION 109 (1991)
(observing that there is "virtue in consistency").

44. Justice Holmes himself fell short of the mark on this particular score. See G.

EDwARD WHITE,

JUSTCE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 453 (1993) ("Since [Holmes] assumed that doctrinal consistency and

theoretical integrity were prerequisites for judicial eminence, he used 'forms of words' to create an
appearance of consistency and integrity."). For a leading account of what led Justice Holmes to change
his mind regarding the protections that should be afforded freedom of speech in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50

U. CI. L. REv. 1207, 1305-17 (1983).
45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARv. L. Rav. 802, 832 (1982).
46. Id.
47. See George D. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 576

(1948) (describing consistency as "intellectually satisfying").
48. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982)

("[B]road judicial review is necessary to preserve the most basic principle of jurisprudence that we
must act alike in all cases of like nature." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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part animates and shapes the rule of stare decisis." 4 9 As many have suggested,
the entirety of constitutional law cannot be placed up for grabs each time the
Court hears a new case.
Some instances of judicial inconsistency are, moreover, perfectly legitimate
to criticize. Consider, for example, judges who change their public opinions
when they are confronted with intense and direct public pressure condemning a
particular decision-not because they have experienced a genuine change of
heart, that is, but because they fear some sort of reprisal. Chief Justice Warren
apparently suggested that such untoward motivation led Justice Frankfurter's
perceptible retreat in upholding the rights of Communists during the 1950s.
"Felix changed on Communist cases because he couldn't take criticism," Warren reportedly griped. 50 Some commentators have suggested that a similar
public outcry prompted Justices Stewart and White to validate the constitutionality of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, only four years after they had
cast profound doubt on its continued validity in Furman v. Georgia.52
Recognizing that judicial consistency contains some value, however, does not
mean that it should be regarded as absolute. The considerable downside of
venerating judicial consistency can perhaps best be glimpsed by examining the
sentiment as expressed in a prospective rather than in a retrospective manner.
Justice Clarence Thomas, not long after being confirmed, is reported to have
informed his law clerks: "I ain't evolving."5 Nearly twenty years later, it seems
safe to conclude that Justice Thomas has kept his vow. 5 4 But at what cost? The
forward-looking pledge of consistency views the judge as Ulysses, binding
himself to the mast to resist the siren songs of new conditions, new evidence,
and new thought.
There is no shame in a judge rethinking old ideas. To the contrary, it is often
the mark of professionals who remain engaged both with the world and with
their craft. Expecting newly minted Justices to arrive at the Supreme Court with
their jurisprudential visions fully formed seems neither realistic nor desirable.
Indeed, if Justices somehow managed to avoid changing their minds about a
single major issue during their entire tenures on the Court, this would be cause
not for celebration, but for lament. Judge Richard Arnold put the point well:
"Consistency is a virtue, but it is not the only virtue, and people who never

49. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 104 (1986).
50. Roger K. Newman, The Warren Court and American Politics: An ImpressionisticAppreciation,

18 CONST. ComEiNr. 661, 677 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reviewing LUCAs A. PoWE, JR.,
THE WARREN CouRT AND AMElicAN PoLTHcs (2000)).
51. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DuKE L.J. 1, 22-24
(2007) (contending that "extralegal context" motivated Justice Stewart and Justice White to uphold
capital punishment's constitutionality in Gregg).
53. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Problem with Clarence Thomas, LEGAL TPIEs, June 17, 1996, at 21.

54. This statement does not contend, of course, that Justice Thomas has never reversed course. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the reasoning
used in a previous case was "an error to which I succumbed").
'
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change their minds may have simply stopped thinking." 5 But if continued
contemplation and reflection are necessary traits for an excellent judge, one
might go a step further than Judge Arnold and acknowledge that judicial
inconsistency, too, can be a virtue.
In contemplating the actual vice of inconsistency, moreover, it is essential not
to conflate an individual judge's consistency with law's consistency. The two
concepts are surely interwoven in myriad ways. Simply because an individual
Justice changes his or her mind, however, does not mean that legal doctrine will
necessarily follow suit. But even assuming that the law changed every time that
a Justice altered course on a legal question, the emphasis attached to an
individual's judicial consistency may nevertheless be excessive. The old legal
aphorism-holding that it is usually more important that a legal question be
settled than that it be settled correctly-is surely accurate." But usually does
not mean always.
Given that Justices today serve for considerably lengthier periods than they
did not long ago,5 the willingness of Justices to rethink their constitutional
views is a matter of increased significance during the modern judicial era. Many
scholars readily acknowledge. that the prevailing understanding of the Constitution has changed over time and believe that ours is a more just society for
having done so. 59 It would seem strange and unwise, then, to advocate a
conception of judging that would limit such conceptual changes only to instances of judicial turnover. Yet worshipping at the altar of judicial consistency
serves to constrain our constitutional understanding in precisely this manner.
Justices who freeze their jurisprudential understandings at the exact moments
they join the Court will, at the end of their seemingly ever-lengthier tenures,

55. See Richard S. Arnold, Mr Justice Brennan-An Appreciation, 26 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 7, 11

(1991). Professor Laurence H. Tribe has similarly noted that a President who nominates a Justice to the
Supreme Court must engage in a certain amount of guesswork regarding how the nominee's views will
evolve over time: "Previous actions and attitudes are of necessity an imperfect crystal ball, for most of
us would prefer that those sitting on our nation's most august tribunals have minds capable of growth."
How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURr JUSTICES
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE Tius HONORABLE COURET
SHAPES OUR HISTORY 90 (1985).
56. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Stare
decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than that it be settled right.").
57. Cf TRIBE, supra note 55 ("The sole dissenting vote from the notorious 'separate but equal'
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 was cast by Southerner John Marshall Harlan. When the former
slave owner was ridiculed for his evident change of mind and heart, Harlan replied that he preferred to

be remembered as being right, rather than consistent.").
58. See Linda Greenhouse, How Long Is Too Long For the Court's Justices?, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 16,
2005, at C5 ("From 1789 to 1970, the average Supreme Court justice served for 15.2 years .... But
since 1970, the average tenure has risen to 25.5 years .... ).
59. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONsTITUTON 2 (2010) ("[I]t seems inevitable that the
Constitution will change . . . . This is a good thing, because an unchanging constitution would fit our
society very badly. Either it would be ignored or, worse, it would be a hindrance, a relic that would
keep us from making progress and prevent our society from working in the way it should.").
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almost certainly end up espousing antiquated constitutional conceptions. 0 Praising judicial inconsistency serves to advance a constitutional understanding that
invites greater dynamism than may otherwise be possible.
Acknowledging this dynamism also requires rejecting the misguided idea that
applauding judicial inconsistency amounts to nothing more than liberal praise
for Republican-appointed Justices sliding leftward. Justice Thomas's purported
disavowal of judicial "evol[ution]" may stem principally from the notion that
those who use such terminology view the conservative judge as Cro-Magnon
Man and view the liberal judge as his fully evolved descendant. Sincere praise
for judicial inconsistency cuts both ways. It simply will not do to portray a
Justice who moves from right to left on a particular issue as acquiring the
wisdom of the ages and to portray a Justice who makes thejourney in reverse as
one who has lost his marbles.
Adherents to judicial inconsistency's virtue, then, must respect not only the
leftward trajectory of Justice Stevens; they must also respect the rightward
trajectory of Justice Byron White. In the realm of employment discrimination,
for instance, Justice White joined the Court's liberal decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. in 1971,62 but eighteen years later he sided with the Court's
conservative bloc to author Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." Supporters of
judicial inconsistency need not agree with Justice White's outcome in Wards
Cove, but they should respect the process by which he reached it.
Ill. JUDICIL INCONSISTENCY APPLIED
It would be surprising, of course, if judges were utterly unconcerned with the
level of esteem in which various communities held them.64 Judges-like mem-

60. Cf Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1045, 1067 (2001) (identifying how the presidential selection of life-tenured Supreme Court
Justices effectively serves to entrench the priorities of past regimes).
61. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIs F. POWEuL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 541 (1994) (stating
that Justice Powell thought that Justice White had drifted to the right over time). Not everyone, of
course, agrees that Justice White did in fact shift rightward over time. Rather, some commentators have
suggested that Justice White, throughout his judicial tenure, embodied the brand of liberalism associated with the president who nominated him to the Court. See, e.g., DENNIs J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PorRATrr OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 445 (1998) ("Byron White and

John Kennedy were tough on crime, tough on communists, friendly to organized labor, and shared a
growing conviction that federal intervention was necessary if racial equality was to be more than a
pious objective.").
62. 401 U.S. 424, 425-26, 431-32 (1971) (invalidating a hiring practice requiring a high school
diploma or a passing result on a general intelligence test because of its disparate impact on black
applicants).
63. 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989) (finding that statistics showing a high percentage of minority
employees in cannery positions and a low percentage in noncannery positions failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact in the absence of statistics showing the percentage of qualified
minority applicants for noncannery positions).
64. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody

Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. EcON. REv. 1, 15 (1993) (contending that "a potentially significant element in the
judicial utility function is reputation, both with other judges ... and with the legal profession at large");
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bers of other professions-are not eager to expose themselves to charges of
either fickleness or incompetence. 6 5 Reputational concerns may explain why, on
the few occasions that Justices have actually acknowledged that a current
position deviates from a prior one, the convention is to approach the matter as
many people approach the removal of a Band-Aid: as quickly as possible, so as
to minimize the pain. Today, Justices generally cite one of three available quips
held in reserve for such occasions. In 1949, Justice Frankfurter coined the most
commonly invoked language to acknowledge a change of judicial heart: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it
comes late."6 6 In Massachusetts v. United States, Justice Robert Jacksonperhaps the most skilled writer in the Court's history-noted, "I see no reason
why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong
yesterday." 6 7 Finally, for those drawn to about-faces of an earlier vintage,
Justice Joseph Story provided: "My own error ... can furnish no ground for its
being adopted by this Court ....
When it comes to citations acknowledging instances of judicial inconsistency,
at least as important as the sentiment being communicated is the reputation of
the judge who did the communicating. 6 9 It is surely no accident that the three
Justices commonly invoked these days to excuse inconsistencies have enjoyed
strong juridical reputations. Even had a jurist held in the lowly esteem of, say,
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson somehow managed-despite himself-to dream
up a wonderful witticism regarding a change of judicial mind, it seems safe to
conclude that just about no one would use it. 70 The none-too-subtle message
being conveyed is: great judges have been inconsistent in the past, and my
inconsistency here should not preclude me from attaining that status.

Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinantsof JudicialBehavior, 68 U.
CN. L. REv. 615, 630 (2000) (suggesting that Justices, "for all that life tenure gives them, are still

human, and thus still somewhat vulnerable to the pull of reputation, the desire for esteem, and the wish
to avoid public criticism").
65. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 903,
952-53 (2005) (observing that Justices are "reluctan[t] to admit they have made mistakes" because
"[s]uch admissions might make the Justices appear to be indecisive or incompetent").
66. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). For a mere sampling of invocations of Justice Frankfurter's line, see Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 614 (2002), (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Frankfurter); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 22
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Frankfurter); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Frankfurter).
67. 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
68. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 478 (1827).
69. If the sheer quality of the turn of phrase were the guiding criterion, Baron Bramwell's bon mot
would surely have acquired more than a meager two citations from Supreme Court Justices. See
Andrews v. Styrap, (1872) 26 L.T. 704 (Exch.) 706 ("The matter does not appear to me now as it
appears to have appeared to me then.").
70. Cf MIcHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW Io CivIL RioHTs: THE SUPREME CouRr AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RAcIAL EQUALrry 302 (2004) (recounting Justice Frankfurter's reaction to the death of Chief Justice
Vinson on the verge of the Brown decision as "the first indication I have ever had that there is a God"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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But if Justices change their minds regarding a particular issue, they should
not simply invoke revered judges and then quickly change the subject. Instead,
Justices should venture at least some explanation of what, precisely, they saw
on the road to Damascus. Despite the premium that the legal community (at
least as a formal matter) places on judicial consistency, examining the evidence
at hand suggests that Justices seriously overestimate the damage that acknowledging inconsistencies inflicts upon judicial reputations. Indeed, rather than perceiving instances of judicial inconsistency as detrimental, many commentators have
instead heaped praise upon Justices who understood that the first thought is not
always the best thought.
A lengthy period of time need not elapse before Justices may, without
experiencing reputational decline, announce that they have reconsidered their
analyses. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, decided in 1940, Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy joined the Court's 8-1 decision upholding a
school district's requirement that all students-including Jehovah's Witnessesrecite the Pledge of Allegiance. Just two years later, however, the trio wrote a
joint dissenting opinion in Jones v. City of Opelika repudiatingGobitis.72 "Since
we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case," the Justices wrote, "we think this
is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it was also wrongly
decided. Certainly our democratic form of government . .. has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities however unpopular and unorthodox those views may be."7 Many commentators both at the time
and in the intervening years have praised the authors for their reversal.
Although the two cases were not on all fours, the joint dissenting opinion in
Opelika had the benefit of announcing that members of the Court were uncomfortable with turning a blind eye to the subordination of religious minorities.
One year after Opelika, the Court famously reversed course and overturned
Gobitis.76
Commentators do not appear to downgrade Justices for judicial inconsistency, even if those Justices played a pivotal role in developing the doctrine that
they ultimately reject. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Justice being more
closely identified with a particular line of cases than Justice Brennan was

71. 310 U.S. 586,591-92, 599-600 (1940).
72. 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, J., Douglas, J., and Murphy, J., dissenting).
.
73. Id.
74. See G. EDWARD WHrE, THE CONSTTUTHON AND THE NEw DEAL 148 (2000) (noting that, through the

dissenting opinion in Opelika, "the textually protected status and the democratic status of speech rights
were once again intertwined"); John Raeburn Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27
WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 525 (1942) (commenting of Opelika that, while there was little redeemable about
the Court's opinion, the case "in the long run will mark an advance for [religious] liberty, because of the
dissenting opinions").
75. Opelika involved the permissibility of collecting licensing fees for proselytizing, not the Pledge
of Allegiance. See Opelika, 316 U.S. at 585-86 (majority opinion).
76. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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identified with the Court's effort to police obscenity.7 7 In 1957, Brennan wrote
the Court's opinion in Roth v. United States, its initial foray into the obscenity
field, and he was repeatedly charged with the Sisyphean task of attempting to
articulate workable standards to govern this murky terrain." In 1973, however,
Justice Brennan wrote in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton that he was "reluctantly
forced to the conclusion" that the quest to defeat obscenity had proved to be a
losing battle.80 "I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth
v. United States," Justice Brennan wrote, "and culminating in the Court's
decision today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing
fundamental First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time has
come to make a significant departure from that approach."8 ' Rather than coming
in for criticism, Justice Brennan's reversal in obscenity has been hailed for its
refusal to permit prior thinking to carry the day. 82
Perhaps the most well-known instance of judicial inconsistency is Justice
Blackmun's shifting view of capital punishment. In 1972, two years after
becoming an Associate Justice, Blackmun, along with President Nixon's three
other Court appointees, dissented from the Court's decision in Furnan v.
Georgia, which cast profound doubt on the death penalty's continued constitutional vitality.83 Although Justice Blackmun (unlike the other Furman dissenters) noted his "distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty,"
he nevertheless insisted that personal views should have no bearing on whether
the practice violated the Eighth Amendment.8 4 In 1994, just months before his
departure from the Court, Justice Blackmun announced his conversion to death
penalty abolitionism in an otherwise unremarkable case. "From this day forward," Justice Blackmun wrote, "I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death."8 5 This line is perhaps the most widely praised of Blackmun's entire
judicial career,86 a career not widely considered among the upper echelon of
Supreme Court Justices, but one that does not want for its share of truly
memorable lines.

77. SETH STERN& STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LBERAL CHAMIoN, 249-64, 365-68 (2010)
(detailing Brennan's long struggle to define obscenity and ultimately his retreat from the endeavor).
78. 354 U.S. 476,479 (1957).
79. See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
80. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 73-74 (citation omitted).
82. See Jeffrey Rosen, We Hardly Know It When We See It: Obscenity and the Problem of
Unprotected Speech, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN's ENDURING INFLUENCE 64, 64-65 (E.

Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) (contending that "it's hard not to admire the
painstakingly incremental quality of Justice Brennan's intellectual evolution" regarding obscenity).
83. 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1.972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 405, 411.
85. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 39, at 178.
87. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows.");
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CONCLUSION

It is far too early at this hour to know whether history will include John Paul
Stevens among the finest Justices to have ever served on the Supreme Court.
Judicial reputations, not unlike presidential reputations, can rise and fall dramatically over a period that sometimes stretches decades. What can be said with
certainty, though, is that if Justice Stevens should be excluded from the judicial
pantheon, it will not be inconsistencies that deprive him of the rank.

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Poor Joshua!"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently.").

